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Lawfulness and the Perception of Legal Salience 
Claudio Michelon 
 
The ability to identify all (and only the) legally salient properties within a complex 
situation is a subjective trait necessarily possessed by a lawful person. This ability is 
better explained as a type perception. The paper puts forward an account of the 
perception of legally salient properties in which perception (i) affords a preliminary 
ordering of the total information received (ii) while allowing for the formation of a 
remainder that explains the peripheral legal perception experienced legal practitioners 
develop over time. After this account of legal perception is in place, the paper 
considers the relationship between this aspect of subjectivity and complete virtue, in 
particular, practical wisdom and lawfulness.  
 
Lawfulness, Practical Wisdom, Perception, Legal Argumentation 
 
1. Practical perception and legal salience 
Reasoning about what is legally required or permitted in a particular situation is 
predicated on the identification of the legally salient properties within that situation. 
The identification of the legally salient properties (hereinafter LSPs) in a concrete 
situation is a complex activity that combines different processes, including a 
preliminary ordering of the situation’s properties (singling out properties that are 
prima facie legally relevant) and the scrutiny of those initially identified properties by 
the production of sound and relevant legal arguments. Given the importance of the 
initial identification of legally salient properties in legal argumentation, it is 
remarkable that the available philosophical accounts of legal argumentation shed so 
little light on it.  
In relation to the initial identification of LSPs, some explanations straddle the line 
between the methodological and the ethical by offering very thin prudential advice on 
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how to search for them,1 while others are happy to consign the question either to the 
realm of the inscrutable (as intuitionism does),2 or to outsource the problem to 
empirical research.3 Yet, neither of those alternatives is sufficient from the point of 
view of (inter alia) a virtue-theoretical justification of the practice of legal 
argumentation in the context of legal decision-making. One such justification 
necessitates a clearer account of the connection between (i) the initial identification of 
LSPs and (ii) the relevant reasons for action than the one provided by prudential, 
intuitionist, and empirical accounts. Sections two and three of the paper present an 
account of this connection by developing the general idea of practical perception and 
adapting it, when necessary, to legal contexts. 
This account is meant to throw light on two related phenomena: (i) an agent’s 
capacity to identify in a particular situation the properties that are included in the 
antecedent of the relevant legal rule before the deployment of the relevant legal 
reasons (the focus of section two), and (ii) an agent’s capacity to identify prima facie 
legally salient properties that do not correspond to any legal rules which the agent 
has explicitly learned (the focus of section three). Accordingly, the paper presents an 
explanation of how perception is able to single out certain features of a more complex 
																																																								
1 Some accounts present a method consisting of a series of steps as a way to increase the 
probability of (or perhaps guarantee) success in identifying the LSPs. See Neil MacCormick, 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2005), 84ff and Klaus Günther, The 
Sense of Appropriateness (State University of New York Press, 1993), passim, specially 229-
239 and 203. Although such steps have prudential value, they fall short of a satisfactory 
account of LSP identification (as I argued in Michelon, 2006). 
2 For intuitionism, the detection of evaluative properties springs from an unanalyzable 
sensitivity to such properties. It has been rightly criticized for making the subjective insight 
inscrutable and for, as McDowell put it, turning the epistemology of value into mere 
mystification”. See John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Harvard University Press, 
1998), 132.  
3 Some legal theorists place the identification of LSPs within the realm of ‘hunches’, whose 
vindication is given by a suitable legal justification, as eg Richard Wasserstrom, The Judicial 
Decision (Stanford University Press, 1961), 25-30 and 65-66. This view does not necessarily 
stem from intuitionism, as there are reasons other than a commitment to intuitionism that 
might justify a lack of philosophical interest in the investigation of the hunch.  
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situation. Although this explanation would go a long way towards justifying the 
reliance on perception as an appropriate way to identify LSPs, the paper does provide 
a complete justification for such reliance.  
Perception is, of course, a subjective attribute and virtue theory’s core business is to 
investigate how an agent’s subjectivity bears on her capacity to handle inter alia 
moral, legal, and epistemic normativity. In fact, perception is often said to be an 
integral part of at least certain virtues. Although legal theorists have tapped into virtue 
theory’s resources to try and clarify the relationship between legal normativity, 
agency, and character traits, not much light has been shed on how the perceptive 
aspect of virtue might help identifying LSPs.  
Much of the discussion on the relevance of a virtue-theoretical approach to legal 
decision-making focuses on the bigger picture. Is there a role for intellectual and/or 
moral virtues in legal reasoning? If so, which moral virtues are relevant? Is it 
lawfulness4 or an aspect thereof (perhaps equity),5 practical wisdom,6 or perhaps a 
division of labour between different aspects of the subjectivity of the virtuous agent. 
But virtues, habits and other complex subjective traits are bundles of personal traits 
which include complex motivational elements (like dispositions to act and feel) and 																																																								
4 I use ‘Lawfulness’ to refer to Aristotle’s “General (or Legal) Justice”. As Kraut put it, 
justice in this sense, “is the intellectual and emotional skill one needs in order to do one's part 
in bringing it about that one's community possesses … [a] stable system of rules and laws”. 
See Richard Kraut, Aristotle (Oxford University Press, 2002), 106. For a further development 
of the idea in relation to contemporary legal systems, see Lawrence Solum ‘Natural Justice’ 
51 (2006) American Journal of Jurisprudence 65, at 85-91 
5 I use ‘Equity’ to refer to the capacity to identify when exceptions to prima facie applicable 
rules are in order, ie Aristotle’s epieikeia. For an excellent account of epieikeia in the 
Aristotelian corpus see Christoph Horn, ‘Epieikeia: The Competence of the Perfectly Just 
Person in Aristotle’ in: Burkhard Reis and Stella Haffmans (eds), The Virtuous Life in Greek 
Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 142-166. 
6 Amalia Amaya has recently articulated three related axes long which the literature on 
practical wisdom and legal reasoning has developed in recent years. Practical wisdom has 
been said to bear on legal reasoning (i) for its potential to help agents deal with particularity; 
(ii) as a form of perception and (iii) for bringing to light its emotive aspects. Each of those 
aspects of practical wisdom has a bearing on the agent’s capacity to describe appropriately the 
situation. (‘Virtue and reason in Law’ in Maksymilian Del Mar (ed), New Waves in 
Philosophy of Law (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) 123-144. 
	 4	
epistemic capacities (such as practical perception and the ability to produce and 
evaluate reasons). In the virtuous character, such traits might well be inseparable. But 
directing our gaze to specific aspects of virtue and to the role they play in legal 
decision-making allows for a more focused discussion of the larger questions. Hence 
this paper’s focus on perception and, specifically, on the role it plays in identifying 
LSPs. 
There can be little doubt that perception is an integral part of virtues in general and, in 
particular, of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.7 Perception has also been 
said to be a crucial part of legal reasoning.8 It looks like a good place to start.  
An initial focus on the role of perception (instead of complete virtue) in the 
identification of LSPs has yet another advantage. It is not immediately clear that 
virtues such as lawfulness, equity, and practical wisdom have much explanatory 
power regarding the actions of contemporary lawyers and judges. Moreover, one does 
not have to be as skeptical as MacIntyre about the moral qualities of contemporary 
lawyers9 to accept the claim that good lawyers are not necessarily more just, more 
equitable, or practically wiser than anyone else, while also accepting that they possess 
a more developed capacity to identify the LSPs in concrete situations. Concentrating 																																																								
7 Perhaps the first (certainly the most influential early) statement of the role of perception in 
virtue comes from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics at 1142a23-30. It is not clear what 
Aristotle means by “perception”, but he does not have only the passive reception of data 
streams in mind (see, for instance, C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of Reason (Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 67-73. 
8 See Amalia Amaya ‘The role of virtue in legal justification’ in: Amalia Amaya and Ho 
Hock Lai (eds), Law, Virtue, and Justice (Hart, 2012), 62-64; see also Amalia Amaya (n 6) 
128-130. 
9 For MacIntyre, the activity of a legal practitioner is one of the clearest examples of the 
fragmentation of the moral life that takes place in modernity (fragmentation that is even more 
perceptible in the experience of a citizen who tries to understand the juridical implications of 
her actions). In his words “[o]urs is a culture dominated by experts, experts who profess to 
assist the rest of us, but who instead make us their victims. Among those experts by whom we 
are often victimized the most notable are perhaps the lawyers” (Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Theories 
of natural law in advanced modernity’ in Common truths: New Perspectives on Natural Law, 
E.B. Mclean (ed) (ISI Books, 2000), 91-118. See also Alasdair MacIntyre Ethics and Politics: 
selected essays volume 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 198.  
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on perception leaves open the question as to whether or not this legal perception can 
be developed (at least up to a point) in a way that is not dependent on the 
simultaneous development of other aspects of the relevant virtue. That is not to say 
that the account of legal perception put forward below cannot be integrated into an 
account of legal argumentation that is predicated on full-blown virtue. In fact, the 
picture of perception presented below is vindicated by its potential to contribute to a 
more nuanced conception of how legal argumentation could be integrated into 
normative arguments stemming from virtue ethics. In section 4 below I map out the 
roles that might be performed by this subjective trait in a complete account of 
lawfulness as a moral virtue. 
2. Sorting normative properties through perception  
Perception of normative properties is sometimes taken not to be a form of perception 
at all, but a metaphor for a particular kind of engagement of reasons for action. In his 
discussion of McDowell’s claim that moral perception has to do with a form of 
“sensitivity to reasons”,10 Jacobson argues that “McDowell’s own talk of moral 
perception must … be taken metaphorically”.11 Yet, there is nothing immediately 
problematic in the idea of perceiving properties of a complex situation as normative.  
A working conception of practical perception starts by the identification of its object. 
What is being perceived by the agent who successfully engages her practical 
perception? Moral perception is concerned with making discriminations, that is to 
																																																								
10 McDowell (n 2) 132. 
11 See Daniel Jacobson, ‘Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception’ (2005) 8 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 387, at 388). Jacobson is (understandably) worried that 
excessive reliance on the moral perception might result in a moral theory with the same 
epistemic shortcomings possessed by intuitionism. For reasons presented below, I do not 
think that reliance on perception commits a theory to any form of intuitionism. 
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say, with “noting a morally significant feature of the situation”.12 A similar point can 
be made about legal perception, whose object is discriminating the legally significant 
features of the situation. Now, not everything that can be said about moral perception 
can also be said about legal perception. If Blum is correct about moral perception, the 
features of a situation recognized as having moral significance create a justificatory 
burden in the moral agent, as they “must be taken into account in constructing a 
principle fully adequate to handle the situation”.13 It is not entirely clear that this is 
true regarding moral perception, but it is certainly not true regarding law. The 
question of whether or not a property of a particular situation is actually legally 
relevant is in no way settled by the agent’s perceptive framework: it is settled by 
sound legal arguments.14 What they do have in common, as remarked above, is that 
they allow the subject to make discriminations between discrete properties found 
within a situation on the basis of a form of sensitivity to the relevant reasons.  
If practical perception (moral, legal, prudential, etc) is a kind of sensitivity to reasons, 
it cannot be a purely passive subjective trait. This is something practical perception 
shares with sense perception: neither is reducible to the gathering by the senses of raw 
data streams. When practical perception is engaged in the search for salient 
properties, what it produces is the perception of something qua something. In other 
words, as part of the production of practical arguments, practical perception is always 
conceptual: it is the perception of an object x possessing a property F. It is always 
predicated on the possession by the perceiving subject of concepts of x and F, and on 
the fact that she deploys those concepts in the experience. It is important to note that 
																																																								
12 See Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 35. Blum believes that is not all there is to moral perception, which would also include 
the ability to weigh adequately those features.  
13 See Blum (n 12) 40-41. 
14 See, inter alia, Amalia Amaya (n 6)129. 
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not all forms of perception (including forms of practical perception) are conceptual. 
But the preliminary sorting carried out by practical perception to identify LSPs in the 
context of legal argumentation is necessarily conceptual. 
This preliminary sorting carried out by legal perception (and other forms of practical 
perception) can be corrected by reasoning. The search for the relevant legal arguments 
might show that properties identified as legally salient turn out not to be answer-
driving legal properties. Reasoning might also reveal the need to rethink the legal 
relevance of properties that are not singled out by perception as legally salient. The 
preliminary conceptual ordering produced by the senses is not the final stage of 
rational ordering.  
Aquinas’s theory of the ‘inner senses’, which I described in more detail elsewhere,15 
describes the division of labour between different aspects of perception while it 
carries out this ordering job. Aquinas believes that there are four inner senses that, 
together, organise data streams into discrete units (gestalts).16 Although the units 
identified by the perceiving subject will vary from one subject to another (and even 
beyond the realm of agents, given that non-human animals might also possess the 
inner senses) the operation of the inner senses is identical.17 So when a lamb looks at 
the wolf it sees more than simply localized shades of grey: it sees a wolf and it sees a 
source of danger. The inner senses are separated into four, by the combination of two 
criteria: whether it deals with non-evaluative properties (like being ‘a wolf’) or 
evaluative properties (like being ‘a source of danger); whether its job is the 
deployment of a previously acquired gestalt to ‘read’ what is perceived by the exterior 
senses or else to the storage of such gestalts within the subject’s perceptual 																																																								
15 (Michelon 2012) 
16 What follows is a sketch of the relatively brief discussion in Summa Theologiae 1a, 
question 78, article 4. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars,  1970), Vol XI. 
17 Herbert McCabe, On Aquinas (Burns and Oats, 2008), 123–27. 
	 8	
framework. This division is important, because the gestalts can change (both by 
addition, subtraction, or revision ) through the subject’s experiences. In the resulting 
picture, the sensus communis deploys non-evaluative gestalts, while the imaginatio 
stores such non-evaluative properties; the aestimativus deploys value-laden gestalts 
(an object might be perceived ‘as valuable’ or ‘as dangerous’) while the remaining 
inner sense (unnamed by Aquinas, but christened sense-memory by McCabe) is in 
charge of storing such evaluative properties. 
This picture explains how perception can be understood as conceptually ‘loaded’, ie, 
as producing an ordering both in terms of perceiving objects and in terms of 
perceiving an object’s evaluative and non-evaluative properties. It is important to 
make clear that accepting that perception can perform this ordering function does not 
commit one to perceptual conceptualism, that is to say, to the thesis according to 
which:  
for any object x and any property F, a subject has an experience as of x being F only 
if she has concepts of x and F, and deploys those concepts in the experience.18 
Accepting that perception is capable of organizing sense data into conceptual 
frameworks is not the same as accepting that perception only happens through the 
possession and the deployment of concepts. In fact, the possibility of non-conceptual 
perceptions (ie perceptions that do not meet the conditions of possession and 
deployment of concepts) enhances the explanatory power of the idea (to be introduced 
shortly) of “legal peripheral perception”. An example regarding the perception of 
																																																								
18  Susanna Siegel, ‘The Contents of Perception’ in Edward Zalta (ed) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/perception-contents/> (accessed 20 august 
2015). 
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physical objects will help to explain what is meant by non-conceptual perception.19 If 
someone fails to see an object he is looking for in a drawer, even though the object is 
in the drawer, in relatively prominent place, but after closing the drawer, recalling its 
contents, realizes that the object was among them, it seems that there was something 
like perception going on about the “contents of the drawer”, and even about 
specifically the object that is been sought, before the deployment of the concept.  
Can this account of legal perception explain a subject’s ability to identify legally 
relevant properties in a particular situation prior to the deployment of the relevant 
legal reasons?  I believe it can. Its merit is to afford an explanation for how a subject 
can display a “sensitivity to reasons” without deploying the complete articulation of 
the relevant reason. A fully articulated legal reason would typically identify all (and 
only) the answer-driving properties in a particular situation. If those properties can be 
stored by the inner senses, they can be deployed in sorting the properties of the case 
even in the absence of the deployment (or even of a conscious articulation) of all the 
answer-driving properties of the case. Because legal reasoning is a rather complex 
endeavor, the initial sorting will sometimes overshoot (by selecting as salient a 
property what is not an answer-driving property) and sometimes it will undershoot 
(by failing to identify a property that is in fact answer-driving). But the possibility of 
error in legal perception could hardly count as an objection to the account presented 
above. In fact, therein resides one of its strengths.  
This perception-centred account of the identification of LSPs is not vulnerable to the 
objection mentioned above that even lawyers who are not remarkably virtuous might 
be very effective at identifying the relevant LSPs. Nothing in the account above 
																																																								
19 This example is borrowed from Michael Martin, ‘Perception, Concepts and Memory’ 101 
(1992) The Philosophical Review 745, at 749. Martin’s example is itself an extension of an 
example presented by Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Routledge, 1969), 18.  
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suggests that legal perception can only be developed by those who also possess other 
aspects of virtue (eg its motivational element). By the same token, this account 
affords a less onerous explanation of how the capacity to identify LSPs can be 
developed. Both complex dispositions of character (like virtues) and perceptual 
frameworks can be modified by experience. But changing the perceptual frameworks 
that inform the inner senses is less complex than instilling complete virtue. To 
provide a comprehensive account of the ways in which changes in our perceptual 
framework occur, in particular in relation to perceiving aspects of complex social and 
institutional realities, is not a simple task. Such change can only occur if two 
conditions are met. First, perceptual frameworks (legal or otherwise) develop by 
experience. For this purpose, experience is not limited to sense-experience, but it also 
includes forms of experience that are not primarily sensorial, such as being exposed to 
hypotheticals and narratives (both real and fictional).20 Second, one needs to engage 
with experience in certain ways. The relevant forms of engagement are indicia of the 
agent possessing intellectual virtues and, conversely, of her not possessing the 
corresponding intellectual vice of perceptual rigidity. 21  Perceptual rigidity can 
manifest itself as an inability to allow experience to influence the gestalts stored in the 
imaginatio and sense-memory. As those gestalts accumulate and become 
progressively more complex they can afford (from a purely functional point of view) 
to resist further change. This rigidity effectively prevents the agent from improving 
the ways in which her perception orders the particulars in a number of contexts. Not 
																																																								
20 Martha Nusbaum has argued convincingly that exposure to the complex fictional narrative 
that is embodied in the modern novel has the potential to enhance a subjects capacity for 
perceiving aspects of a situation which might have been opaque to her otherwise. See Martha 
Nussbaum, Poetic Justice (Beacon Press, 1995, passim; for a summary of the argument see 
pp. 4-12) 
21 See Robert Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues (Clarendon Press, 2007), 202-4. 
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all change is made impossible, as the rational agent might still perceive the need for 
further elaboration by the operation of argument.  
Perceptual rigidity might also manifest itself as an incapacity to retain the “richness” 
practical perception. This form of rigidity has a direct and negative impact in the 
subject’s peripheral legal perception (on which see below). The avoidance of 
perceptual rigidity is a matter of the agent possessing the relevant intellectual virtues, 
but a detailed discussion of these virtues here would distract from the main 
argument.22  
Appropriate engagement with experience is, then, able to change the conceptual 
frameworks that allow perception to perform its preliminary organizational role. 
Typically, the kind of experience that might impact on an agent’s legal conceptual 
framework is the experience of legal cases (often through secondhand narratives), and 
the form of engagement that is appropriate as a way to improve this framework is 
legal argumentation, that is, argumentation about whether or not a property or set of 
properties initially identified within of a particular situation is (are) indeed legally 
relevant.  
3. Peripheral Legal Perception  
The account of perception presented so far focused on legal perception’s ability to 
‘order’ experience by sorting out the legally salient properties in a particular case. 
This aspect of practical (and legal) perception is conceptual (as defined above). But 
not all perception is conceptual. In the last section the thesis that perception should be 
conceived as ‘rich’ was introduced with regard to sense-perception. The richness of 
sense perception refers to the possibility that the content of perception exceeds the 
																																																								
22 In article 48 of the Summa Theologiae II-II, Aquinas presents a list of eight integral parts of 
Practical Wisdom (prudentia). He also refers to previous attempts to identify integral parts of 
Practical Wisdom dating back to Aristotle. See Aquinas (n 16) Vol XXXVI. 
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content that was neatly captured by concepts deployed by the perceiving subject. In 
Martin’s story, presented above, about a subject perceiving the contents of the drawer, 
the concepts are only deployed after the perceptual experience has ended, that is to 
say, after the drawer was closed and the cufflinks were not being directly perceived. 
In that story, perception leaves a trace onto which the conceptual understanding of the 
presence of the cufflinks in the drawer can latch onto. If there is a trace left from 
gazing into the drawer, it seems clear that non-conceptual perception was what left 
that trace. The more general point the story is to illustrate that perception is too rich a 
phenomenon to be fully captured into conceptual perception. There is no reason to 
believe that legal properties might not be embedded in the same context of sense-
perception richness. It might be that something that was registered by the senses in a 
way that is pre-conceptual turns out to be a legally salient property. In that sense, 
‘contractual agreement’ is not significantly different from ‘cufflinks’. But there is 
another sense in which the context wherein the perception of LSPs occurs can be said 
to be rich.  
The identification of legally salient properties might also be predicated on traces of a 
different kind. In the normal course of business of a lawyer, she will be faced with 
relatively large data sets. A client will typically bring to his lawyer copious amounts 
of information, in a number of different forms (documents, mere allegations, etc); a 
judge will be presented by the parties with copious information about the situation 
form which the dispute arose. Those data sets are information-rich in the sense that 
only part of the information will be incorporated in the legal arguments produced by 
the subject to find an answer to the legal problem. Some of the information will be 
deemed by the lawyer to be legally inert in relation to the relevant legal problem. But 
they would not necessarily be considered legally irrelevant tout court. Thus, each case 
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might leave a remainder within the lawyers involved. Those leftovers from previous 
cases are the stuff from which a subject’s peripheral legal perception is formed.  
Peripheral legal perception explains an agent’s ability to identify a particular property 
as legally odd (ie as requiring further investigation) even in cases that fall squarely 
within (or outwith) the available rule. It provokes an irritation in the inner sense’s 
ordering of the sense-data which points towards a possible shortcoming of the 
subject’s legal perceptual framework. As Maksymilian del Mar observed recently, 
this form of “irritation” of the inner senses has moved so far from sense-perception as 
to make it an ability of an entirely different kind.23 Yet, it is still a way to move the 
decision-maker beyond the available frames of reference (ie, the property sets that 
have been learned qua legally relevant and incorporated by the inner senses as such). 
Now, if this rough picture of legal perception is correct, some light is shed on how 
subjectivity can operate productively in contexts of legal decision-making and, in 
particular, on how one can “creatively break the law”.24 
So here is the resulting picture of how legal perception develops. An experienced 
lawyer, who engages appropriately with her experience, develops a complex 
framework of gestalts through which her inner senses organize the world. Those 
gestalts are formed as the answer-driving properties that were incorporated into 
successful legal arguments in previous cases accumulate in the imaginatio and in the 
sense-memory. The answer-driving properties are the properties in previous cases that 
attracted the relevant legal rules to resolve the legal dispute in that case. Such answer-
driving properties, however, are always drawn from a much more complex set of 
properties belonging to each case. So in each case the lawyer would have learned both 
																																																								
23Maks Del Mar, ‘Judging Virtuously: Developing an Empathic Capacity for Perceptual 
Sensitivity’ 5(1) (2014) Jurisprudence, 177. 
24  Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully (Kluwer, 2001), 77-78. 
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about properties that are immediately legally relevant and about properties that are not 
immediately legally relevant. So the lawyers experience will also generate a 
peripheral legal perception inhabited by properties that were not explicitly learned 
qua legally relevant, but might turn out to be so.  
 
4. Perception and Lawfulness 
As we saw in section one, an advantage of locating the initial selection of LSPs in 
perception is that an account of the development of perception can be informative 
without reference to a complete theory of a virtuous character or even to a complete 
theory of a particular virtue. Virtues are complex combinations of subjective traits, 
which comprise not only perception, but also inter alia, dispositions to act (ie to react 
to perceptions and/or reasons) and emotional responses. A perception-centred 
explanation of the capacity for initial selection of legal properties offers a more 
frugal, albeit sufficient, account of the phenomenon. The perception account’s 
frugality, however, is compatible with considering the capacity for appropriate initial 
property selection as either (i) an integral part of a virtue or as (ii) a subjective trait 
external to that virtue (albeit perhaps instrumentally related to it).  
Here we must tread carefully. There are two different ways in which a subjective trait 
can be said to be part of a virtue. On the one hand, the possession of a certain 
subjective trait S by one particular individual a can be said to be a necessary condition 
for the possession of the relevant virtue (say lawfulness). On the other hand, the 
possession of S by a might be said to be predicated on a also possessing all other traits 
that constitute that virtue. Affirming the first kind of relationship between subjective 
trait and lawfulness is to say something about the concept of lawfulness and it 
answers to the question of whether it is possible for anyone to be lawful without 
	 15	
possessing S. Affirming the second kind of relationship is to say something about the 
conditions under which S can be developed, namely, that it is not possible to develop 
S in the absence of the remaining elements of lawfulness.25  
Importantly, it is possible to claim that the relevant subjective trait (in our argument, 
the initial perception of LSPs) is an integral part of the concept of lawfulness in the 
first sense (as a necessary condition for the possession of the virtue), and yet its 
possession might not predicated on the possession of other aspects of lawfulness.  
Denying that S is internal to lawfulness in the first (conceptual) sense or in the second  
(developmental) sense leaves open the question of which other kind(s) of relationship 
could there be between S and lawfulness.  
If it does not depend on the possession of complete lawfulness, the capacity to 
perceive LSPs accurately could still be a useful skill that a lawful person would do 
well to possess, much like excellence in the craft of braiding reins for horses might 
help the courageous rider in a battlefield (while not requiring the possession of 
courage for its development). But braiding reins (i) is not an integral part of courage 
and (ii) it might serve a purpose that bears no relationship with courage. Many a 
modern lawyer would be comfortable with an account of her abilities to interpret and 
help to enforce the law (including the capacity for initial perception of LSPs) as skills 
which are not necessarily connected to any moral virtues she might possess, including 
lawfulness. In fact, the way in which contemporary lawyers deal with positive law 
appears to be closer to the way a craftsman deal with their trade instruments. Law’s 
																																																								
25 To this second question different kinds of answers can be given. First, arguments might be 
put forward in support of a conceptual connection between S and other aspects of lawfulness 
so that the development of S cannot happen in the absence of one or more of the remaining 
elements of lawfulness. But it might also be that there are empirical reasons why the 
development of S in subject I cannot happen (or is less likely to happen) if I does not possess 
at least some other subjective elements of lawfulness. 
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instrumental value26 (as opposed to its value as such) has been often commemorated 
and also taken for granted, and legal experts have been both praised and vilified for 
their ‘craftsmanship’. Contemporary lawyers seem to be closer to other Aristotelian 
‘craftsmen’, as even the actions of the well-meaning lawyer appear to be justifiable 
only by the external ends they serve. Accordingly, those who are in charge of 
implementing the law are frequently seen as specialists on choosing the right means to 
achieve ends which are only contingently connected them (hence MacIntyre’s 
grumpiness with the modern lawyer).  
If, however, the capacity to identify LSPs through legal perception is not considered 
to be a skill only contingently (if sometimes productively) connected to lawfulness, 
but instead is taken to be integral part of the virtue, other kinds of questions arise 
regarding the ways in which it relates to the remaining aspects of lawfulness and, 
more generally, to other virtues, including practical wisdom. These questions are 
acutely pressing for those who accept contemporary defenses of the doctrine 
according to which all virtues form a unity. At its most basic, the doctrine of the 
Unity of Virtues (UV) simply states that it is not possible that an agent would have 
already acquired one of the character virtues without having acquired all the other 
character virtues.27 According to UV, the virtues are said to imply one another and 
form a unity and that unity is brought about by practical wisdom. Thus put, UV might 
appear implausible, as it is at odds with the very common experience of knowing 
																																																								
26 Although Brian Tamanaha (in Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge, 2006), chapters 1-4 
and passim) has written against conceptions of law as a means to an end, Leslie Green rightly 
argues that his complaint in not so much about law’s instrumentality, but about using law to 
pursue certain valueless ends and points out that there seem to be a relatively broad consensus 
about law’s instrumentality (see, Leslie Green, ‘Law as a Means’ In Peter Cane (ed) The 
Hart-Fuller Debate in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2010), 169-188, esp 171-173). 
27 As Aristotle put it in the Nichomachean Ethics, at 1144b33-35. 
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people who appear to have developed virtues unevenly.28 It is not uncommon to know 
people who are brave, but not very generous, or who are just, but cowardly when 
faced with certain kinds of danger. In fact, that apparent implausibility is at the root of 
some contemporary objections to the UV. Those objections, however, are only a 
challenge for one of two very different possible readings of UV. As Russell put it: 
The thesis that phronesis entails all the virtues could be the thesis that, for 
any agent, that agent can have phronesis only if that agent also has all the 
virtues; or it could be the thesis that any theoretical model of phronesis must 
also be a model of all the virtues.29   
The empirical observation that different virtues (and different elements of a single 
virtue) might develop at different pace in different individuals is only a challenge for 
the first reading of UV. Typically, the kind of challenge faced by the second reading 
would be either a defense of an alternative theoretical model in which each virtue can 
be fully realized independently of other virtues30 or, more radically, a defense of an 
alternative theoretical model in which the full realization of one virtue conflicts with 
the full realization of another virtue.  
As Russell has remarked, the plausibility of either challenge relies on a conception of 
virtue as a subjective disposition to act in a certain way when the agent finds herself 
in certain typical situations. A brave person’s decision would typically not be swayed 
by her fears, when facing danger. A temperate person would not eat excessively, even 
when presented with a wonderful banquet. In this view of the virtues, they each 
possess a sphere of concern that is insulated from the spheres of concern of other 
virtues. If virtue is conceived in this way, learning the sphere of concern of one virtue 																																																								
28 A point acknowledged by many a defender of UV. See inter alia, Julia Annas, Intelligent 
Virtue (Oxford University Press, 2011), 83 and Daniel Russell, Practical Intelligence and the 
Virtues (Oxford University Press, 2009), 336-7. 
29 Russell (n 29) 337. 
30 See Walker ‘Virtue and Character’ 64 (1989) Philosophia), 350-1.  
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and developing a disposition to act in a particular way within its proper sphere would 
not imply the need to know the sphere of concern of another virtue and develop the 
appropriate dispositions. Moreover, there would be no reason to believe that two 
virtue spheres could not overlap and, at least in some occasions, pull in opposite 
directions. If virtues are conceived in this way, it is difficult to see how UV could be 
justified (at least in the absence of further argument).  
But virtues are not simply dispositions to act in certain ways in typical contexts. It is 
not enough that certain actions are performed by the subject in those contexts: they 
must be performed for the relevant reasons. As John M Cooper put it: 
“…in order to have the knowledge necessary for any full virtue, one will 
have to appreciate fully and be moved by all the good reasons there are in 
support of all sorts of virtuous reaction to things and events there are…”31  
Thus acting from a virtue is not something that can be done by mere habit or 
compulsion. In acting from a virtue, one must be acting for reasons.32 That is the crux 
of Aristotle’s suggestion that the virtues are intrinsically connected through practical 
wisdom, an insight that has been further developed by contemporary virtue theory.33 
As Daniel Russell has put the difference between the two conceptions of virtue: while 
virtues conceived as discrete dispositions to act well in certain contexts provide 
“trajectories”, virtues as excellences provide “direction”.34 In the ‘trajectories’ view, 
possessing a virtue is simply a matter of continuing to do more or less the same thing 
one learned to do in relevantly similar contexts. In the ‘direction’ conception of 
virtue, what the virtue produces is an inclination towards performing the action that is 																																																								
31 John Cooper, ‘The Unity of Virtue’ 15(1) Social Philosophy and Policy (1998) 233, at 272. 
32 Russell (n 29) 344 
33 Aristotle suggests it at Nichomachean Ethics, 1144b1-1145a11, and the thesis is defended, 
among others, by John McDowell ‘Virtue and Reason’ in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote 
(eds), Virtue Ethics (OUP, 1997), 141-162, at 142; Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics 
(OUP, 1999), 153; Annas (n 29) 83-99; and Russell (n 29) 335-373. 
34 Russell (n 29) 339-348. 
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required by the correct appreciation of the reasons which underlie the virtues bearing 
on the situation.35 The correct appreciation of the reasons will sometimes explain that 
the actions which would be normally performed by habit need to be avoided, as other 
reasons, learned in different contexts, should control the action in the instant case.  
Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that allows one to identify in an instant case 
the reasons that justify the actions a virtuous agent is inclined to perform in certain 
virtues-specific contexts. It is fidelity to those underlying reasons that ultimately 
constitutes virtue, and it is the possibility of deliberating about what those reasons 
require in the instant case that makes practical wisdom the touchstone of all virtue.  
However, in relation to lawfulness, practical wisdom would not be able to identify the 
actions required without engaging with the LSPs within the situation at hand and that, 
in turn, would suggest that the initial selection of LSPs is an ability that is not only an 
integral part of lawfulness, but an integral part of practical wisdom. 
The perception-centred account of initial identification of LSPs in legal 
argumentation is not meant to be incompatible with a virtue theoretical account of that 
ability. It simply provides a more frugal account of the phenomenon that frames 
further research on how positive law and legal argumentation interact with virtues.  
The lion’s share of the work, however, is yet to be done.  
																																																								
35 ibid, 341. 
